‘The "annual fee" tax on health insurers will result in a premium increase of $60 to $160 per person in 2014, rising to $100-$300 by 2018, for the average insured individual -- and over $260 per family in 2014, rising to over $450 in 2018, for families with employer-sponsored, fully-insured coverage.’
Note: Click chart to the right to enlarge.
‘The logic behind this tax is that insurance companies will make money from increased enrollment due to the ACA, and therefore should pay more to the federal government. However, in order to remain in business, as well as to meet state and federal solvency and actuarial requirements, insurers will have to pass most of this tax along to policyholders in the form of higher premiums, or possibly higher average out-of-pocket costs or reduced benefits.
The form this tax takes makes it easy for the government to forecast its revenue. However, it is difficult or impossible for businesses to calculate the tax they will owe until well after the tax liability is incurred, in part because each insurer's tax liability depends not only on their own revenue, but on that of every other covered insurer in the country. In addition, certain types of health insurers are exempt from the tax.’
‘However, there is another effect not widely recognized. Most people enrolling through exchanges will receive a premium subsidy based on the difference between a specified percentage of their income, and a standard insurance plan (the second-lowest-priced silver plan available in their location for their family size). If the premiums are increased to pay the health insurance tax, the subsidies will automatically increase by the same amount – in effect, the federal government will be paying the tax to itself in the case of subsidized exchange customers.
This effect will partially apply in the case of those with fully insured employer-sponsored health plans. Because the premiums for employer-sponsored insurance are a form of compensation not counted as taxable income (regardless of whether they are allocated to the employer or the employee), the federal government will not collect personal income tax or FICA (payroll) tax on this amount. When the premiums increase to pay the health insurance tax, collections of income and payroll taxes will be reduced, on average, by the amount of the health insurance tax times the marginal tax rate of affected workers. This means that the federal government will be paying a portion of this tax (ranging from about 15 percent to about 40 percent, depending on the worker's income) to itself, though not the full amount as in the case of subsidized exchange enrollees.
In the case of Medicaid, CMS regulations[17] require that states pay premiums to Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) that are “actuarially sound.” Because taxes and fees are necessary costs incurred by MCOs, they must be included in the determination of actuarially sound rates. As a result, MCOs will be fully reimbursed by the state and federal governments for the cost of this tax.[18]
In short, a substantial portion of this tax is simply transferred from the insured customer to the government, and back to the insured customer – and in the case of Medicaid, from government to government – with the insurance company serving as an intermediary in both directions. However, even in cases where there is no direct tax or budgetary impact, there will be administrative costs associated with the tax borne by both the government and the insurance companies. These particular administrative costs represent complete and unambiguous waste, as they benefit neither patients, providers, insurers, other taxpayers, nor the government.
The “annual fee” tax will, however, have its full impact on exchange enrollees without subsidies. This includes those not eligible for exchange subsidies – either because their employer offers individual coverage only,[19] or because their income exceeds four times the federal poverty level for their family size.’ - Impact of the Health Insurance “Annual Fee” Tax, Executive Summary, Robert A. Book, 02/20/2014
Link to the executive summary appears below:
http://americanactionforum.org/research/impact-of-the-health-insurance-annual-fee-tax
Showing posts with label transfer payments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label transfer payments. Show all posts
Saturday, February 22, 2014
Saturday, November 5, 2011
Distribution of Income and the Transfer Agent
Distribution of income statistics and statistics in general can be manipulated to make particular arguments the particular presenter wants to represent. That said, a point made many times by Thomas Sowell is that the numbers shown in many, many presentations of distribution of income statistics are not “net”. That is, subtract taxes from the producer class and add back entitlements and transfer payments to recipient classes and you find the numbers flatten.
Consider a
third path. Take the numbers, before netting out taxes and adding back
transfer payments/entitlements, and create a third category known as state or
government. Please see the following:
Scenario
One [common depiction of showing “net”]
(1) X pays Y transfer/entitlement tax and the tax is removed from gross. Hence we might say X’s income is 100 minus
30 transfer/entitlement tax leaving 70. Z’s income is 60 minus 20 transfer/entitlement
tax leaving 40,
(2) Q’s income is 10 plus 20 transfer
received equaling 30. P’s income is 30 plus entitlement 10 equals 40.
Scenario
two [new path/alternate]
(1) show X,Z,Q and P’s income,
(2) show the total transfer/entitlement
tax,
(3) show the true recipient of the
transfer/entitlement tax as the transfer agent [state],
(4) show the transfer agent’s costs
applied to the transfer process [administration charge].
(5) Now we have X and Y in the same
position yet Q and P are in lesser positions as less income remains to transfer.
Upon
further review, those that advocate class warfare to facilitate the redistribution
of income based upon social justice purposely leave out the conduit of the
entire process they champion. In this case the middle-man is not a market maker
with special knowledge to facilitate markets; the middle man is purely a
transfer agent facilitating nothing other than a pure transfer. Stated alternatively, in
this particular case a subtraction of value rather than the addition of value
[facilitating markets with information] are the product of the middle man.
This
subtraction of value is not done so at a bare minimum. We are not gazing at a
robust competitive system to deliver the transfer/entitlement at the lowest
possible subtraction value. Rather, we have a monopoly delivering the
subtraction value. A monopoly is going to deliver the subtraction of value at
the highest possible cost.
Beware the
extraction of consumer surplus by a monopoly.
In the
classic case of the economically uninformed “do-gooder”, referred to many times
by Milton Friedman, the do-gooder advocates a program yet fails to follow
through on the cascading unintended consequences that spider across an economy.
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